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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 870327-CA 
v. : 
JORGE AQUILAR, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1986). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction for 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third-Degree Felony, 
U.C.A. Section 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i), and a final judgment of the 
Fourth District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park presiding. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err in ruling that the defendants 
fourth amendment rights against unreasonable searches and 
seizures had not been violated when the defendant was stopped and 
searched as a direct result of defendant's failure to make eye 
contact with a highway patrol trooper, who then claimed that the 
defendant's behavior supported a "reasonable suspicion, based on 
objective facts" that the defendant was engaged in criminal 
activity? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE STATUTES 
A. United States Constitution, Amendment IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
B. Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 14. 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
C. Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-7-15 (1982). 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he 
has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n for 
Possess ion of a Cont ro l led Substance, a Third-Degree Felony, and 
a f i n a l judgment of the Fourth D i s t r i c t Court , Judge Boyd L. Park 
p r e s i d i n g . 
B. Course of the Proceedings . 
Defendant made h i s f i r s t a p p e a r a n c e in the E i g h t h 
C i r c u i t Court on March 18, 1987. In a l l cour t appearances , he 
was s u p p l i e d w i t h a S p a n i s h - s p e a k i n g i n t e r p r e t e r . The 
p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g was h e a r d on March 2 3 , 1987. (R. 4) 
Defendant en te red h i s not g u i l t y plea before Judge Boyd L. Park 
of t h e F o u r t h D i s t r i c t C o u r t on A p r i l 3 , 1 9 8 7 . (R. 24-
25) Defendant ' s Motion to Dismiss , or in t h e A l t e r n a t i v e , t o 
Suppress Evidence was f i l e d upon April 22, 1987 (R. 27) , and the 
suppress ion hear ing was heard by Judge Park on April 28, 1987, 
one day before the t r i a l . Defendant ' s motion was den ied . (R. 39-
40) 
C. D i spos i t i on in the Court Below. 
Defendant was t r i e d before a j u r y and was found g u i l t y 
on A p r i l 29 , 1987. (R. 73-78) On June 5, 1987 defendant was 
sentenced to an inde te rmina te term not to exceed f ive y e a r s in 
t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n , but was p l a c e d on c o u r t - s u p e r v i s e d 
p r o b a t i o n , f ined $1,000.00 and assessed $250.00 for the Victims 
Reparat ion Fund. All p r i son time was suspended, except for s ix 
months in the Utah County J a i l . (R. 84-85) 
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D. Statement of the Facts. 
1. The State's Witnesses1 Testimony. 
As Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol 
was driving north on March 14, 1987, he observed the defendant 
walking across the "old" Highway 91 south of Nephi. (R. 124) 
The defendant, a native of Mexico, was carrying a gas can. (R. 
136, 121) Sergeant Mangelson pulled a U-turn and slowly, at 
three to four miles per hour, approached the defendant, so that 
he could offer the defendant a ride. Although the sergeant's car 
came within four or five feet of the defendant, the defendant did 
not make eye contact with the sergeant. The sergeant believed 
that the defendant was "completely avoiding" him. (R. 121-
122) The sergeant made no effort to speak with the defendant and 
did not turn on his overhead lights. (R. 130-131) 
The defendant then began to walk up the freeway off 
ramp. (R. 126) Sergeant Mangelson "wanted to take a look at 
this guy when he come back and why he was acting or why he was 
avoiding me struck me real funny." (sic) (R. 126) He 
positioned his patrol car where he could see the three gas 
stations in the immediate area and waited to see the defendant 
return for more gasoline. (R. 122) 
Sergeant Mangelson waited 20 minutes, but did not see 
the defendant return. (R. 122) Another trooper exited the 
freeway, stopped to talk to the sergeant, and, upon the 
sergeant's question, advised him that he had seen a person "with 
a can of gas putting gas in the vehicle," and that the vehicle 
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was a blue and white van. This second trooper also advised the 
sergeant that the driver and the vehicle had proceeded north 
about fifteen minutes prior to this conversation. (R. 122) Upon 
receiving this information, the sergeant radioed dispatch to have 
a trooper in the "south end" take a "close look at this blue and 
white van." (R. 123) 
Trooper Doug Rawlinson of the Utah Highway Patrol was 
"stationary" at the southbound side of the freeway south of the 
south Santaquin interchange, having pulled over a driver for 
speeding, when he heard the dispatch over his car radio regarding 
the blue and white van. Although he could not distinguish 
Sergeant Mangelson's words over the radio, he noted an "urgency" 
in Sergeant Mangelsonfs voice. (R. 132) The trooper allowed the 
speeding driver to leave and then received instructions from 
dispatch to watch for a "blue and white van and take a close look 
at it." As he listened to the radio, he noticed the van coming 
from the south on the other side of the freeway. (R. 132) 
The trooper testified that, as he watched from the 
other side of the freeway, the defendant "didn't look at me he 
stared straight ahead even though I had been in plain view for 
quite a distance, he didn't make any acknowledgement that I was 
there and just stared straight ahead . . ." (sic) (R. 133) At 
this time, the trooper also noted that the defendant's van was 
possibly too close to the car ahead of it. (R. 133) Upon 
questioning by defense counsel, the trooper admitted that, 
without the transmission over his radio regarding the blue and 
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white van, he "probably wouldn't have noticed [the defendant] 
when he drove by, " (R. 139-140) as he was still busy with the 
driver he had pulled over for speeding. 
In order to follow the defendant, the trooper pulled a 
U-turn on the freeway and caught up with the defendant. (R. 133) 
He then activated his overhead lights and stopped the defendant's 
vehicle because it was weaving back and forth, and he believed 
that the defendant might possibly be intoxicated. (R. 133-
134) Although the trooper determined that the defendant was not 
intoxicated, the trooper invited the defendant back to his patrol 
car, since the defendant had not been able to immediately produce 
the registration for the van and to name the owner of the van. 
(R. 136) The trooper, through the use of the radio, determined 
that the van was not stolen, but obtained the defendant's written 
consent to search the van. (R. 136-137) He and Sergeant 
Mangelson, who had driven to the scene of the stop, found 
evidence during the search of the van upon which the State filed 
its information for possession of a controlled substance. (R. 
138) 
2. The Defendant's Testimony. 
The defendant's van ran out of fuel on the freeway in 
the area of Nephi, Utah at approximately 8:00 p.m. on March 13, 
1987, after which the defendant waited for the highway patrol to 
assist him. No highway patrol troopers came, so he spent the 
night in his van. (R. 101) At about 7:00 a.m. the next morning, 
he caught a ride to a gas station, where he spent $3.00 for 
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gasoline which he poured into his gas can. (R. 101-102) Without 
incident and without passing any highway patrol vehicles, he then 
returned to his van and poured the gasoline into the gas tank. 
(R. 102-103) 
At that time he noticed a highway patrol trooper pass 
his van. (R. 102-103) He then returned in the van to the gas 
station and spent $13.00 to put gasoline into both the van and 
the gas can. (R. 108-109) He did not see any highway patrol 
vehicles in the area of the gas stations off the freeway during 
this second trip to the gas station. (R. 113) He then returned 
to the freeway and continued on his journey, until he was stopped 
by Trooper Rawlinson of the Utah Highway Patrol. (R. 103, 109) 
The defendant did not recall driving in any manner which would 
have justified a stop by the highway patrol. (R. 103) 
After he was stopped by the trooper, he was taken back 
to the trooper's vehicle, where he voluntarily gave his written 
consent for the search of his van. (R. 105-106) 
The trial court, after hearing the testimony of the 
defendant and the State's witnesses, chose to believe the State's 
testimony as to the facts. (R. 145-147) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The citizens of Utah are protected from unreasonable 
searches and seizures by both the United States Constitution and 
the Constitution of Utah. The United States Supreme Court 
established the standard for investigatory stops which do not 
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amount to official arrests in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), 
and in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), which standard has 
been codified in U.C.A. Section 77-7-15. An officer must have a 
"reasonable suspicion" to believe that the person he wants to 
stop is presently or has been involved in criminal activity. If 
this reasonable suspicion exists, he may demand a name, address 
and an explanation of the person's actions. An inarticulate 
hunch will not suffice. Terry, supra. 
In the instant case, this Hispanic defendant's van was 
ultimately searched and seized, and the defendant was arrested 
and convicted of the crime of possession of a controlled 
substance because of an officer's inarticulate hunch. The 
officer's hunch was based upon the defendant's alleged refusal to 
make eye contact with the officer, while the officer, in his 
patrol car, passed the defendant, who was walking along a state 
road toward the freeway with a can of gasoline in his hand. 
Based upon this brief incident and the officer's 
unfounded suspicions, the officer waited for the defendant to 
return to the gas station for more gasoline. When the defendant 
did not fulfill the officer's expectations by returning for more 
gasoline, the officer called dispatch on his radio and asked for 
other officers to watch for this defendant. Another officer, who 
would have never noticed the defendant without the radio 
transmission from dispatch, saw the defendant, pulled a U-turn on 
the freeway and followed the defendant, eventually pulling the 
defendant over because he was allegedly weaving back and forth in 
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h i s l a n e of t r a f f i c . 
The Utah Supreme Court and t h e Utah Court of Appeals 
h a v e r e c e n t l y e n u n c i a t e d c l e a r a n d c o n c i s e s t a n d a r d s f o r 
i n v e s t i g a t o r y s t o p s in c a s e s ve ry s i m i l a r t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e : 
S t a t e v . T r u j i l l o , 60 Utah Adv. R e p . 52 ( 1 9 8 7 ) and S t a t e v . 
Swanigan , Utah , 699 P.2d 718 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . Using t h e r e a s o n i n g found 
i n t h e s e c a s e s , i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e f i r s t highway p a t r o l o f f i c e r 
d i d n o t h a v e a r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was 
e n g a g e d i n any t y p e of p a s t , p r e s e n t , o r a t t e m p t e d c r i m i n a l 
a c t i v i t y . However, t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r a c t e d upon h i s u n r e a s o n a b l e 
s u s p i c i o n , n o t i f y i n g d i s p a t c h t o have o t h e r o f f i c e r s watch fo r 
t h e v e h i c l e . B e c a u s e o f t h e r a d i o n o t i c e and t h e same 
u n r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n , a s e c o n d o f f i c e r l a t e r s t o p p e d t h e 
d e f e n d a n t and s e a r c h e d t h e v a n . A d m i s s i o n of t h e e v i d e n c e 
o b t a i n e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e s e a r c h of t h e van shou ld have been 
e x c l u d e d by t h e lower c o u r t . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE 
D E F E N D A N T ' S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AGAINST 
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES HAD NOT BEEN 
VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE F I R S T O F F I C E R ' S 
UNREASONABLE SUSPICIONS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND THE 
SECOND OFFICER'S INVESTIGATORY STOP. 
The F o u r t h Amendment o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
C o n s t i t u t i o n and i t s v i r t u a l t w i n , A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 14 of t h e 
C o n s t i t u t i o n of Utah , b o t h g u a r a n t e e t h e r i g h t of i n d i v i d u a l s t o 
be p r o t e c t e d from u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s . In T e r r y 
9 
v> Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, the United States Supreme Court ruled 
that the conduct of peace officers making "investigatory stops" 
or "searches" which do not amount to arrests must be evaluated by 
the following objective standard: 
And in making that assessment it is imperative 
that the facts be judged against an objective standard: 
would the facts available to the officer at the moment 
of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken 
was appropriate? Anything less would invite intrusions 
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on 
nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a 
result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. 
Thus, officers of the law are prohibited by the U.S. 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution from acting upon 
suspicions which are unreasonable and groundless or merely 
"inarticulate hunches." 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has 
determined that a seizure occurs when, because of an officer's 
show of authority or physical force, a person believes he is not 
free to walk away from the officer. State v. Trujillo, 60 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 52, 53, (Utah App. Ct. 1987), quoting from United 
States v. Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544, 533 and 555 (1980). The 
Court further illustrated this concept by giving examples: 
Examples of circumstances t h a t might i n d i c a t e a 
s e i z u r e , even where the person did not a t tempt to 
leave, would be the t h r e a t e n i n g presence of s eve ra l 
o f f i ce r s , the display of a weapon by an of f icer , some 
physical touching of the person of the c i t i z e n , or the 
use of l anguage or tone of voice i n d i c a t i n g t h a t 
comp l i ance wi th t h e o f f i c e r ' s r e q u e s t might be 
compelled. Tru j i l lo at 53. 
Unless a person i s "seized" by an officer within the meaning 
of the Consti tution as i l l u s t r a t e d above, then i t i s impossible 
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for the person's Fourth Amendment rights to have been violated. 
Id. at 53. 
U t a h h a s f u r t h e r g u a r a n t e e d t h i s r i g h t a g a i n s t 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s by cod i fy ing Terry in 
U.C.A. 77 -7 -15 : 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he 
has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
It should be noted that this Utah statute further 
defines the scope of reasonable suspicion by requiring that the 
officer believe that the person is involved in some type of 
criminal activity, either past, present, or attempted. State v. 
Carpena, Utah, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (1986). It is not enough that a 
person may act in a manner inconsistent with the expectations of 
the officer. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY ESTABLISHED UTAH 
STATUTORY LAW AND UTAH CASE LAW (SWANIGAN AND TRUJILLO) 
WHEN IT RULED THAT BOTH OFFICERS HAD REASONABLE 
SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY. 
1. State v. Trujillo, 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (1987). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has very recently dealt with 
the issue of searches and seizures as they relate to 
investigatory stops in State v. Trujillo. In this case, the Utah 
Court of Appeals, Judge Billings, writing the opinion, outlined a 
two-step analysis for determining that a person's right to 
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protection from unreasonable searches and seizures has been 
violated during an investigatory stop: (1) The Court must find 
that there has been a seizure; and (2) the Court must find that 
the seizure was unconstitutional. 
In determining whether a seizure had occurred in 
Trujillo, the Court of Appeals used the standards established in 
Mendenhall and discussed above. The Court found that a seizure 
had, indeed, occurred, because the defendant had been physically 
held by the officer and then ordered to place his hands on the 
patrol car and spread his feet. Additionally, the officer 
performed a pat-down search of the defendant's person. Trujillo 
at 53. 
In the instant case, there certainly was a seizure of 
the defendant. Both the defendant and Trooper Rawlinson 
testified that the trooper "invited" the defendant back to sit in 
the trooper's patrol car. (R. 105, 136) It was in the confines 
of the trooper's patrol car that the defendant consented to the 
search of his van. Shortly thereafter, an additional officer, 
Sergeant Mangelson, arrived on the scene. (R. 137) Although the 
defendant had not yet been placed under arrest, he certainly, 
based upon the totality of the circumstances, was not free to get 
in his van and leave—there were several highway patrol officers 
present, he did not speak English as a native language, and he 
had been lead back to the highway patrol car by Trooper 
Rawlinson. Therefore, the first step of the Court's two-step 
analysis was satisfied: there was a seizure of the defendant 
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under the Fourth Amendment. 
In determining whether the seizure in Trujillo was 
constitutional, the Court looked very carefully at the fact 
situation, using the standards found in Terry and U.C.A. Section 
77-7-15 (1982), and found that the seizure was unconstitutional. 
The officer stopped Trujillo and his friends on State Street in 
Salt Lake City because of the lateness of the hour (3:30 a.m.), 
the high-crime factor of the area, the apparent nervous conduct 
of the three friends, and the suspicious nylon knapsack Trujillo 
was carrying. Id. at 52, 54. The Court found that these four 
factors did not support a reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity was occurring. The trio was not loitering, but was 
consistently making progress down the street. Id. at 52. In 
addition, the Court found that the nervous behavior was 
consistent with both innocent and criminal behavior. Id. at 54. 
The officer never inquired as to the knapsack, nor did he 
articulate what concerned him about the knapsack. Id. at 54. 
The Court found that the officer had been unable to point to 
specific facts to support his hunch that some criminal activity 
was occurring on State Street. Id. at 55. Therefore, the pat-
down search violated Trujillo's Fourth Amendment protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the evidence 
obtained in the pat-down search should have been suppressed. Id. 
In applying Trujillo decision to the instant case, it 
is clear that the suspicions of the first officer, Sergeant 
Mangelson, which lead to the notification of the second officer, 
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were unreasonable and nothing more than an inarticulate hunch. 
In his testimony at the suppression hearing, the sergeant 
testified that there was no law against running out of gas on the 
freeway, and that the defendant was breaking no law by walking 
with a gas can toward the freeway. (R. 128) The sergeant also 
testified that the defendant was under no legal obligation to 
make eye contact with the him. (R. 128) In addition, the 
sergeant never turned on his overhead lights to require the 
defendant to speak with him, nor did he simply stop and ask the 
defendant if he needed a ride. (R. 128) Other than driving 
slowly by and close to the defendant, the officer himself made no 
effort to communicate with the defendant, but he still found the 
defendant's behavior suspicious* (R. 130-131) 
As in Trujillo, the defendant was not involved in any 
activity which would have been unusual or suspicious. He was 
simply performing a task which, unfortunately, many people have 
had to perform once or twice — walking or hitchhiking for gas 
after failing to plan ahead. And, as in Trujillo, the sergeant 
became suspicious because of what amounted to nervous behavior— 
the defendant refused to look at the sergeant. As the Court 
noted previously, this could be "consistent with innocent as well 
as with criminal behavior." Defense counsel noted in her final 
argument at the suppression hearing that it is not "unusual for 
anyone driving down the freeway to avoid meeting the eyes of an 
officer at the side of the road. [She believed that] anyone who 
has gone around the point of the mountain and suddenly seen an 
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officer and slammed on the brakes has not attempted to meet the 
eyes of the officer." (R. 143) Under this officer's standard of 
reasonable suspicion, most drivers could be stopped on a daily 
basis. 
The sergeant's suspicions were further heightened when 
the defendant failed to return for more gas. (R. 126) Even if 
the trial court chose to believe the sergeant's version of the 
facts over the defendant's version, the sergeant could not 
justifiably suspect that the defendant was involved in criminal 
activity just because he failed to purchase more gas in the Nephi 
area. 
Therefore, under the standards established by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Trujillo, it is clear that Sergeant Mangelson 
could not and did not articulate reasonable objective facts for 
suspecting that the defendant had engaged in or was about to 
engage in criminal conduct, and that Sergeant Mangelson had no 
justification for calling dispatch and requesting that another 
officer watch for and look closely at the defendant's blue and 
white van. (R. 123) 
2. State v. Swanigan, Utah, 699 P.2d 718 (1985). 
Previous to the Utah Court of Appeals ruling in 
Trujillo, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Swanigan, a case 
very similar to the instant case because of the involvement of 
two police officers, briefly addressed the question of the 
standard to be used by officers in making investigatory stops. 
In this case, a police officer enroute to the scene of a burglary 
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noticed two individuals walking along a road about a block from 
the burglarized home. The two individuals allegedly "stared" at 
the officer, who then called the dispatcher and requested a 
broadcast of an "attempt to locate" the two individuals he had 
seen. Id. at 719. 
Over two hours later, a second officer spotted two 
individuals who fit the description given by the first officer 
and stopped them and asked for identification. A warrant check 
made on the two men revealed an outstanding traffic warrant on 
one of the individuals, and the second officer arrested both men. 
Items stolen from the burglarized home were then recovered during 
a pat-down search of the pair. Id. at 719. 
The Utah Supreme Court found that the evidence seized 
during the pat-down search had been erroneously admitted at the 
trial. The Court based its analysis on the standard found in 
Terry and further quoted Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), 
noting that a brief investigatory stop of an individual is 
permissible when the officers "have a reasonable suspicion, based 
on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal 
activity." Swanigan at 719. It is this standard from Brown v. 
Texas that has been codified in U.C.A. 77-7-15. 
In Swanigan the Utah Court found that both officers 
lacked a reasonable suspicion that the two individuals might have 
been involved in criminal activity. The second officer stopped 
the two men solely because of the first officer's description of 
two men seen in the neighborhood of a recent burglary. Neither 
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officer had observed the men engaged in any unlawful or 
suspicious activity or had any knowledge that the men had been at 
the scene of the crime. Id. at 719. The Court found that the 
stop was based on a "mere hunch," as in Terry v. Ohio, rather 
than on reasonable suspicion. 
In the instant case, ironically, rather than raising 
the officer's suspicions by staring at the police officer, this 
Hispanic defendant raised Sergeant MangelsonTs suspicions by 
refusing to make eye contact with the officer, thereby convincing 
the sergeant that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity. 
Unfortunately for the defendant, like the defendants in Swanigan, 
he was unable to correctly guess how to react while walking past 
a police vehicle. 
Twenty minutes later the sergeant radioed ahead because 
the defendant failed to fulfill the sergeant's expectations that 
he would immediately return for more gasoline. The failure to 
make eye contact and to return for more gas comprised the sum 
total of the sergeant's "reasonable suspicion" of criminal 
activity. By this officer's reasoning, it would appear that 
every driver passing through Utah can now be reasonably suspected 
of criminal activity if he runs out of gas and fails to 
immediately return to a gas station after using gasoline from a 
gas can to partially refuel his vehicle. Clearly, the sergeant 
was acting upon nothing more than the "inarticulate hunch" 
frowned upon by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio and by 
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Swanigan. 
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As a result of the sergeant's inarticulate hunch, 
another officer, who was busy at the time and who would not have 
otherwise noticed the defendant's van, was requested by dispatch 
to watch for the defendant's vehicle, which coincidentally passed 
him at the very moment he was listening to the radio dispatcher. 
At this point the facts in Swanigan and the instant case can be 
just slightly distinguished. In Swanigan the second officer 
stopped the individuals strictly because they fit the general 
description given by the first officer. After backup officers 
arrived, a warrant check was made on the two men, an arrest 
warrant was discovered with regard to Swanigan, and the arrest 
and pay-down search followed. In this fact situation, even though 
the officers may have attempted to justify the arrest and 
subsequent search through the discovery of the outstanding arrest 
warrant, the Court found that there had been no reasonable 
suspicion to support the stop. Id. at 719. 
In the instant case, the second officer admits that, 
without the notification by dispatch over his radio to watch for 
a blue and white van, he probably would have never noticed the 
defendant's blue and white van. (R. 42-43) With no other reason 
or justification other than the first officer's hunch, the second 
officer watched the blue and white van pass by him on the other 
side of the freeway. He then conveniently noticed that the van 
might be following the car ahead too closely. (R. 133) After 
noticing, like the first officer, that the defendant refused to 
look across the freeway at him and make eye contact or "any 
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acknowledgement" that the officer was watching him from across 
the freeway, the second officer pulled a U-turn on the freeway 
and followed the defendant's vehicle until he caught up with it. 
After closing in on the vehicle, the officer, again, conveniently 
noticed that the van was traveling five miles per hour under the 
speed limit and that it was weaving in its lane. At that point 
he activated his overhead lights and pulled the defendant over. 
(R. 133-134) 
Although the second officer in the instant case had to 
work harder and longer than the second officer in Swanigan to 
stop the defendant, the end result in both cases is the same. As 
in Swanigan, all evidence acquired as a result of the search was 
inadmissible. The events leading to the search of the vehicle 
and the subsequent arrest of the defendant were a direct result 
of Sergeant Mangelson ' s unconstitutional hunch regarding the 
defendant's behavior. There was absolutely no reasonable 
suspicion to justify the sergeant's notifying dispatch that the 
defendant's vehicle should be watched for and followed. The 
second officer's reasonable suspicion that the defendant was 
involved in criminal activity was the result of the notice over 
the radio, the defendant's failure to look across the freeway, 
thereby acknowledging the officer's presence, and the officer's 
weak excuse that the defendant may have been following another 
vehicle too closely. However, these reasons do not amount to 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; under Swanigan and 
Trujillo, these reasons only amount to the forbidden inarticulate 
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hunch. 
Clearly, the rules and reasoning set forth in Trujillo 
and Swanigan are persuasive that both officers failed to 
establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the part 
of the defendant. The trial court erred when it refused to 
suppress the admission of the evidence found in the illegal 
search and seizure. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests that, because his 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the two highway patrol 
officers, his conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
be reversed and that the case be remanded to the lower court for 
a new trial. 
DATED this 22nd day of AprIE, 1987. 
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